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Acknowledging the Crisis in Social Liberalism: 
A Call for a New Approach to Teaching Social Policy  
 
Roger A. Lohmann 
West Virginia University 
A graduate social policy course at West Virginia University has been 
redesigned by a senior faculty member and lead instructor to recognize 
advances in political philosophy and to confront the decline of the social 
liberal welfare state and the rise of populist radicalism, through civic 
engagement by citizen-professionals. 
 
Introduction 
First of all, I would like to commend the School of Social Work at the 
University of South Carolina for playing host to this historic conference. 
Those of us who teach and practice social policy in schools of social work are 
accustomed to interacting with our students and our non-policy colleagues 
and our communities. However, as I look over the past three decades of my 
teaching and work in this area, one of the things that stands out most is the 
limited number of opportunities there have been for the kind of collegial 
exchange which is occurring here.  
My overall purpose in this presentation is to follow up on what I see as the 
implications of certain recent work in political philosophy for the teaching of 
social policy. Most recent attentions in social work have been focused around 
the crisis in liberalism as a practical matter. My primary interest in this 
paper is to treat it as an intellectual and theoretical concern. Political 
philosophy is a peculiar hybrid – an uneasy mixture of the esoteric concerns 
of professional philosophers with the pragmatic concerns of the rest of us 
about the basis of our collective life. After several decades of apparently being 
completely moribund, something of a renaissance in political philosophy 
began in the wake of John Rawls’ celebrated Theory of Justice, first published 
in 1971 (Rawls, 1971). My particular approach to both philosophy and policy 
is informed in general by Deweyian pragmatism, and in particular by 
Benjamin Barber’s criticisms of what he calls ‘the conquest of politics by 
philosophy’ (Barber, 1988). My approach is also informed by Theodore Lowi’s 
recent suggestion that ours is an age of ideology (Lowi, 1995).   
According to Barber (1988), “The historical aim of political theory has 
been dialectical or dialogical:  The creation of a genuine praxis in which 
theory and practice are sublated and reconciled, and the criteria yielded by 
common action are permitted to inform and circumscribe philosophy no less 
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than philosophical criteria are permitted to constrain the understanding of 
politics and informed political action.” Barber, like pragmatists in general, 
opposes this concern of political philosophy with creating a more authentic 
public life to the kind of spectator or grandstand views of political and social 
theory which suggest that the philosopher (or social scientist) is somehow 
apart from, and in a superior position to political action. 
Yet, he says, “in much of what passes for political philosophy in the age of 
liberalism, reductionism and what William James called 'vicious 
abstractionism' has too often displaced dialectics and dialogue.  The outcome 
has been neither political philosophy nor political understanding but the 
conquest of politics by philosophy.”  
“Pragmatism, phenomenology, and hermeneutics, to name a few, have all 
assiduously nourished an understanding of the political that does not 
reflexively assume that the political is to be subsumed under or reconstructed 
as the philosophical, or that philosophy can thrive by conquering politics and 
reducing it to a problem in epistemology" (Barber, 1988, 4). 
As Barber notes, there is something ironic in a pragmatic stance on 
politics, since so many of the best known pragmatists, including Pierce, 
James and Mead have been notably apolitical in their writings. The same 
might be said of the best-known phenomenologists and hermeneuticists. In 
fact, among this group, only John Dewey has had much to say about matters 
political, although more recently, Richard Rorty appears to be attempting to 
address some of these issues, and a variety of Europeans, including Jurgen 
Habermas have been influenced by the American pragmatists. 
In any event, following Barber, my intent in this paper, as in the 
classroom, is to harness the insights of political philosophy without losing 
touch with the fundamentally practical concerns of social policy. To 
paraphrase Karl Marx’s famous dictum: The key reason for striving to 
understand the world is to enhance our chances of improving it. 
The Crisis in Social Liberalism1 
The crisis in social liberalism referred to in my title is the crisis in 
liberalism – a subject which has been a standard topic of social science and 
political theory discussions since long before I first became aware of it as a 
high school student in the late 1950’s.  As closely as I can define it, the crisis 
                                               
1 In this paper, I mean the terms liberalism, social liberalism and New Deal 
liberalism interchangeably in their conventional American usages, which 
differ diametrically from European uses, where the term neo-liberalism has 
roughly the same meanings as the U.S. terms conservatism, neo-
conservatism and, more recently connote populism tinged with 
authoritarianism (Dean, 1996), nativism, fear of strangers and racism. 
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refers to our inability to agree upon a stable public philosophy which 
adequately reconciles the rights and prerogatives of the individual and the 
public good of the community in some lasting and intellectually satisfactory 
way.  
The implications of the crisis in liberalism for social policy are many and 
profound. In most general terms, so long as the crisis exists, solutions to 
social problems will always be tentative and provisional, and subject to 
unraveling at any time. The recently controversial nature of such seeming 
sacred policy cows as public education, freedom of speech, and social security 
– as well as such never-settled matters as mental health, poverty and social 
services – should be very instructive. In this unstable environment, achieving 
a social policy solution may be only the minor half of the problem. In the long 
run, maintaining the institutional legitimacy and efficacy of particular 
solutions-in-place may require substantially greater time, energy, resources 
and commitment. Thus, any social worker interested in social change should 
have more than a little interest in the crisis in liberalism. 
What is the nature of the crisis in liberalism? Barber quotes Rousseau 
(The Social Contract, Book 1, Chapter 6, p. 12) as follows:  “The problem is to 
find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole 
common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, 
while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as 
free as before.” The absence of such an integrated solution can be expected to 
yield coercion by the state and/or alienation of the individual.   
The awareness of the liberal crisis arose during the first years of the 19th 
century in the European (primarily German) reaction to Adam Smith’s 
political economics and, somewhat more generally utilitarianism. Most of 19th 
century social science, politics and social movements can be read as a 
reaction to this crisis: Corporatism, German social liberalism, utopianism, 
American civic republicanism, social Darwinism and socialism (including 
such important variants as Marxism, trade unionism, anarcho-syndicalism 
and Fabianism) to name just a select few. But these also, to date, have proved 
to be as unsatisfactory as the liberal individualism they challenged. As 
frequently as not, political philosophies stultify and confuse, while the 
practice – rather than producing harmony and community – opens new 
arenas for discord and dissension.  
Social work has its own particular history of relating to the crisis of 
liberalism. The particular set of solutions posed by Jane Addams and the 
settlement house movement were at least as much about coping with the 
crisis of liberalism as they were about founding and institutionalizing a 
particular social service strategy (the neighborhood or community center). 
For much of this century it appeared, at least to progressive American 
eyes, that objective social science offered the intellectual solution to the 
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liberal crisis and that a gradualist, or incremental, welfare state under the 
benevolent watchful eyes of a new class of disinterested public professionals 
(including social workers, public administrators, public health professionals 
and others) posed the best practical solution. Ideology was allegedly 
banished. Laissez-faire was consigned to a benighted past. Collectivisms of 
the more dangerous and threatening type (National socialism, Fascism, 
Stalinism, Maoism) were either defeated in the second world war or 
contained within the second world behind an “iron curtain”. Politics, if not 
exactly banished from the modern world, could at least be isolated from the 
more serious and socially productive activities of civics and administration. 
Then, what should have been the moment of triumph which John Kenneth 
Galbraith once called The Liberal Hour (1960) gave way to increasing 
disillusionment and malaise with government. Incrementally dismantling the 
welfare state (now relabeled bloated bureaucracy) became a centerpiece for 
what remains of the public purpose. Just a few short years after Daniel Bell 
tolled The End of Ideology and Sheldon Wolin and Isaiah Berlin proclaimed 
the death of political philosophy, both ideology and philosophy have returned 
with a vengeance (Bell, 1962; Berlin, 1997; Wolin, 1960). 
As Barber notes, “This is the liberal challenge:  to accommodate conflict 
and ameliorate competition without surrendering individuality, to employ 
power in the service of liberty, to contain the aggressiveness that issues out of 
man's individuality without destroying the liberty that is individuality's chief 
virtue, to accommodate the requirements of order and legality and yet remain 
as 'free as before'” (Barber, 1988, 27-28). 
Politics has been defined as many things – the art of the possible, and so 
on. Benjamin Barber’s approach is, in my view, particularly helpful because 
he focuses on the epistemological – the nature of political knowledge – 
without falling victim to the spectator view. He is worth quoting in full on 
this matter, and I have done so in the footnotes of this paper, even though I 
will only summarize the full quote here.2 
                                               
2 "To speak of the autonomy of the political is in fact to speak of the sovereignty of the political.  For by 
sovereignty is meant not merely the dominion of the state over other forms of association, but the dominion 
of politically adjudicated knowledge, under conditions of epistemological uncertainty, over other forms of 
knowledge.  To be sure, this sovereignty over knowledge is wholly residual:  It comes into play only with 
the breakdown of ordinary cognitive consensus, and only where such public judgment is required by the 
need for common action.  Where knowledge can prove itself certain, or at least where consensus is for the 
time being undisputed (as in the case of mainstream science, for example), or where the absence of 
consensus has no impact on public action (as in matters of private taste, for example), the political domain 
claims no sovereignty.  But where scientists disagree on the public outcomes of experimental technologies 
(genetic engineering, for example), or where matters of taste are seen to have public consequences (the 
design of a national flag, for example), or where theoretical inquiry raises issues of common import (the 
dividing line between a fetus and a legal person, for example), the political realm necessarily becomes 
sovereign over the contested realms of science and taste and inquiry in which such disputes are ordinarily 
conducted.  For at this point science, taste and theoretical inquiry are reduced to opinion (doxa ), and it is 
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The realm of political knowledge, in Barber’s sense, boils down to two 
principle criteria which we might call uncertainty and publicity. Is the matter 
at issue a question of settled scientific, legal or religious certainty? Or, is it 
an uncertainty (a matter of opinion)? As an example, members of the Flat 
Earth society may believe what they wishes without discernable political 
consequence. The fact that the earth is not flat has been settled to the 
satisfaction of most of the public by satellite photos and belief that it is not 
tends primarily to marginalize and trivialize their political position.  
In at least some cases, the same result arises from a body of settled law. 
For example, one factor which must constrain all current abortion debate is 
the fact that the issue of whether abortions are constitutional has been 
settled until further notice. Contestants may acknowledge this as political 
fact, ignore it, or wish that it were not so, but they may not wish it away. It 
remains one of the certainties of the situation. 
The second factor characterizing the realm of the political is publicity , (in 
its original meaning of public-ness and not its current meaning of self-
advertisement). Genuinely political matters are matters affecting, or of 
concern to, us all. Thus, the sordid private details of private lives being 
played out in Washington in recent years are public in so far as they impact 
upon the ability of the government to function.  
The recent effects of all this on social work – what might be termed its 
crisis of public posture – have been disenchanting in the extreme: A 
profession which once prided itself on its public presence has been reduced to 
one more special pleader in a polity given over entirely to interest group 
bargaining. And, social policy teaching which had been directed at preserving 
and extending social citizenship and ways of discovering and attaining the 
public good has been increasingly directed at how to get – or keep – ‘our 
share’ of the public pie. We have, to some degree, become those very seekers 
after the spoils of government our professional ancestors warned us about! 
Not yet well chronicled, but morally dispiriting to anyone of conscience is 
the rise of special pleading as the principle public posture of the social work 
profession. Announcements to the effect that “client benefits were lost but 
third party payments were saved” have become altogether too commonplace. 
Just this past month, many of us received an email message proclaiming as 
“A Great Victory” the temporary halting (for two years) of a measure to stop 
Medicaid payments for social work services in nursing homes. Can anyone 
                                               
over opinion that sovereignty, defined by public judgment, necessarily holds sway, albeit only by default."  
(14-15) 
He summarizes thus: 
 "This lesson about the nature of political sovereignty can be reduced to a single priority rule:  
Whenever private theorists disagree on matters of public import, then the normal epistemological priority 
of truth over opinion is over-ridden and reversed in favor of the political priority of public over private."  
(15) 
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seriously believe that postponing this initiative for two years was a truly 
great victory? Do you believe that two years from now, there will not be 
another (and probably more successful) elimination attempt? 
At the present moment the social work profession has no greater special 
purpose or public role than tobacco farmers, or the liquor lobby and 
considerably less than arms merchants. The crisis of liberalism has reduced 
us to just another set of special pleaders. And, only through recovering a 
workable public philosophy which will serve as a resource in the public arena 
is it likely that social work can recover an adequate moral and political basis 
for effective social policy. Those who believe that the current politics of 
special interest sufficiently serve the needs of our clients and the best 
interests of the profession will, of course, take issue with me on this. 
Social Policy 
The other major term in my title is social policy, by which I mean to 
address several things in this paper. First, given the focus of this conference, 
I mean to address the subject matter currently taught under that heading in 
schools of social work. The present social policy paradigm in social work 
education is a rather peculiar and unstable mixture of vocationalism and 
liberal learning forged during the 1960’s. It arose out of a curious amalgam of 
English post-war welfare state thinking (e.g., Marshall, Titmuss, Donison), 
legal scholars (e.g., Charles Schottland), community and urban sociology (e.g., 
Freeman & Jones, Warren, Moynihan) modernization theory (e.g., Wilensky 
and LeBeaux), social planning (e.g., Morris, Kahn, ) and a patina of pluralist 
political theory (Dahl) and institutional economics (e.g., Galbraith, Myrdal).  
Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s noted essay, “The Professionalization of 
Reform” , provides a fairly complete capsule summary of the assumptions and 
world view of what might be termed the Policy Profession movement. 
(Moynihan, 1965) The journal in which Moynihan’s essay was first published, 
Public Interest, along with Transaction Press’ journal Society together served 
as the publications branch of a loosely-coupled network which also included 
academic social scientists, upper-level federal bureaucrats and congressional 
staff members, a few key Congressional patrons and a growing national 
network of nonprofit and university-based centers and institutes. 
Social work was late to join the movement and, it would appear, equally 
late in letting go. Through the mediation of key centers, in particular the 
Heller School at Brandeis University, the assumptions and expectations of 
the policy professional movement gradually came to play a defining role in 
shifting the social work policy paradigm away from an earlier view 
represented by the table in Appendix C.  
The political fortunes of the policy professional movement have been in 
decline for some time now. Like other aspects of “the liberal establishment” in 
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public life, they have given way to the advancing conservative juggernaut. 
The sections of Patrick Moynihan’s book, Miles to Go: A Personal History of 
Social Policy devoted to discussing his “Professionalization. . .” essay and the 
Public Interest read like a eulogy of that movement (Moynihan, 1996). Social 
work education, however, appears to be having great difficulty in letting go. 
Denial, it seems, can be as pervasive and difficult to acknowledge in the 
death of movements as in the death of persons.  
The policy professional paradigm in social work education is reinforced by 
the current CSWE policy standard M6.10 (shown in Appendix A) which was 
changed only slightly from the earlier standard 7.10 (shown in Appendix B), 
which in turn replaced an earlier, and much more detailed specification built 
around the older, but still familiar Needs and Resources model (shown in 
Appendix C). It is important to note, therefore, that the standard itself is 
ambiguous in its coverage: allowing both the policy professionals paradigm 
and alternatives such as the one endorsed in this paper. 
Early adherents of the professional policy paradigm forthrightly 
acknowledged the lack of a sufficient theoretical basis for the American 
welfare state (e.g., see the papers in Schottland, 1967). More recent sources 
have generally dispensed with the theoretical caveats and qualifiers, 
although it is uncertain that any of the underlying theoretical problems of 
welfare state theory as a particular solution to the liberal crisis have been 
resolved. We all have come to banter about the American welfare state when 
it is still not clear what, exactly, a welfare state is and whether in fact in 
America we have one. There is a gigantic body of opinion on the subject, but 
the issue itself remains political in that it is anything but a scientific 
certainty.  
The present social policy paradigm in social work education as I 
understand it appears intended to create informed professionals able to act as 
bureaucratic (and to a lesser extent, legislative and judicial) change agents 
within the broad scheme of contemporary interest-group liberalism. That is, 
professionals capable of engaging in policy practice that recognizes and acts 
upon the complex of legislation, court rulings, administrative law and 
regulations, policy bulletins and other policy paraphernalia.  
A somewhat broader and more diffuse secondary educational objective 
(which is covered by the liberal arts emphasis in the standards) is 
compensating for the weaknesses and deficiencies in our student’s civic 
education and awareness, regarding the history, philosophy, sociology and 
economics of American public life and government. Almost all of my concerns 
in this paper fall under this second category. 
The present social policy paradigm in social work education as I read it 
also fosters an epistemology much like the philosophical posturing criticized 
by Barber above, except that it is the “certain truths” of social science, rather 
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than philosophy (or established religion) for which claim to a privileged 
epistemological position is made. The formula is a simple one, reaching back 
to the charity organization society investigations of the last century: Certain 
knowledge of the causes and etiologies of contemporary social problems 
should yield both a correct public understanding of the problem and detailed 
awareness of what to do about solving it.  In the liberal progressive state of 
20th century America, such certainties should entitle the profession to the 
privileged status of experts in the policy process. (More will be said on this in 
a moment.) 
My thesis in this paper is that the current priority ordering of the two 
objectives of social policy teaching – call them the policy practice objective  
and the civic objective – need to be reversed, and that new and expanded 
attention needs to be paid to the civic, or citizenship roles of social work 
professionals. We (that is, various bodies of technical experts in social work) 
believe that we already know enough to solve most social problems: The 
problem is they  (that is, the non-expert rest of the citizenry) either don’t 
know that we know, or don’t accept our knowledge! The challenge is 
translating that knowledge politically into viable policy within the terms of 
Barber’s sense of politics (that is, through dialectic and dialogue with those 
who do not share the certainty) without violating Rousseau’s constraint. If 
the opposition is simply overwhelmed (which is extremely unlikely at the 
current moment) the result will be further alienation and the cycle will begin 
anew. If the opposition is successful, the status quo (which includes unsolved 
social problems) remains in place. 
The crisis of liberalism as it impacts upon social policy making is not 
tactical; the answer is not merely discovering and employing the right 
methods. The problem is political in the deepest sense of that term. Thus, the 
profession of social work needs to rediscover the commitments to real 
democratic politics – and particularly dialectics and dialogue.  
Getting Out in Public 
To explore these ideas further, I would like to use as a departure point 
certain disagreements with a number of particular points raised by Robert 
Fisher and Howard Karger in their recent book, Social Work and Community  
in a Private World: Getting Out in Public  (Fisher & Karger, 1997)  
Consistent with my argument, the nature of my disagreement is neither 
scientific nor professional.  My disagreement is a purely political one, over 
the best course of collective action. As I understand the part of their 
argument which relates most directly to social policy teaching, social work is 
(or could be) a progressive “vanguard” profession capable of providing 
leadership in comprehensive social improvement through public sector 
reform, and that we as social policy instructors should concentrate on 
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improving our students tactical understanding, political skills and supplying 
them with the correct ideology.  
My argument as already stated, social work is not currently capable of 
embracing that vanguard role but I agree that it should be in the future. My 
principle disagreements are over how to define such a vanguard role for social 
workers and how to prepare students for it. My argument is not with Fisher 
and Karger as individuals; I take them to be giving voice to the consensus 
policy paradigm referred to above. 
 According to them, “When focused on social change, social work education 
can be an excellent means for (1) acquiring or further developing a broad and 
critical understanding of the public sphere that influences almost all aspects 
of daily life, (2) tying this contextualization to specific skills and work, and (3) 
developing an ideology steeped in critical analysis, values and theory. Taken 
together, these factors can turn social workers into social change agents – 
drum majors for social justice – and turn social work education into education 
for social change.” (xii) I agree, it could be an excellent means, but currently 
is not; students do not presently have the requisite skills, nor suitable 
ideologies nor the requisite analytical skills. 
The conventional liberal dichotomy between private and public social 
worlds which Fisher and Karger use as their departure point is unnecessarily 
limiting, as I have argued elsewhere (Lohmann, 1992). There is a large and 
rapidly growing intermediate world of voluntary association and collective 
action between private and public which I choose to call the common whose 
historic role has been to serve as a staging area for creation of precisely the 
kind of public life Fisher and Karger call for. Yet, the social policy paradigm 
in social work barely recognizes this third space at all. Social workers once 
excelled in the common arenas of small groups, community organizations, 
social movements and voluntary associations. While devolution is bringing 
these “voluntary sectors” back into the forefront of social action, it is not at all 
clear that the social work profession will play any role in these developments, 
much less the kind of vanguard role Fisher and Karger envision.  
At the same time, the conventional distinction they make between 
progressive and conservative public goods is outdated and masks the real 
distinctions which have been driving U.S., and to an extent first-world 
politics in general, for several decades now. This difficulty is best illustrated 
by examining their contrast of progressive public goods with  conservative 
ones. A progressive public good is said to be “inclusive, democratic and 
equalitarian” while a conservative public good is said to be “exclusive, 
dominated by hierarchical institutional and corporate oligarchies and vastly 
unequal.” (xiii) It is simply misguided to make such facile generalizations 
about anything as multi-dimensional as contemporary conservatism. 
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If this distinction is held, for example, one must ask in the words of the 
old labor song which side social work is currently on, since a great deal of 
social policy action by the profession is clearly directed at protecting the 
exclusive prerogatives of the profession, and at reinforcing hierarchical 
institutional and corporate oligarchies and inequalities. Indeed, in a world in 
which social workers strive to hold onto some rudiments of the welfare state 
and appear to all the world to have no realistic program of proposed changes, 
while radical fundamentalists have an increasingly clear and pointed 
program of social change, is not the desire to hold onto the outdated 
liberal/conservative dichotomy of the past itself evidence of precisely this sort 
of conservative public good? 
It is not my intent, however, to defend the claim that social work is a 
conservative (or for that matter, a liberal) profession. Rather, I wish to assert 
that attempts to cast the social politics of the current period in the familiar 
terms of ideological opposition between New Deal liberals and conservative 
defenders of the old order, or status quo ante are misguided and seriously 
wide of the mark. At the very least, the problem is one of conflict, as Lowi 
suggests, between two liberalisms and two conservatisms (Lowi, 1995). In my 
view, the dichotomy itself should not be sustained, for reasons I will now lay 
out.  
The first reason is that, somewhat paradoxically, what we mean by the 
term conservative has changed dramatically in recent years. For one thing, as 
the previous example suggests, conserving and protecting the gains of the 
recent past has placed social work in an entirely different posture than it was 
in 30 years ago. 
Further, the level of conservative discourse has risen considerably from 
the days when conservative was frequently a synonym for segregationist on 
the one hand, and “old order know-nothing” on the other. As recently as the 
1950’s, conservatism was so insignificant in American public life that Lionel 
Trilling could claim that there were no true conservative ideas in our culture, 
only “irritable mental gestures which seek to resemble ideas.”  Recent 
grouchy, jingoistic screeds like those by Oliver North, Pat Buchanan, and 
Phyllis Schlafly (to name but three) certainly show that there is more than 
ample contemporary representation of this same genre, but then the New 
Left has generated a comparable amount of such flummery.  
However, anyone who has seriously encountered conservative writers like 
Robert Bork knows that while the irritability is still present, the level of 
conservative discourse has risen considerably in recent decades. Indeed, 
continuing to equate the arguments of first-rate conservative thinkers like 
Frederick Hayek, Robert Nozick, Leo Strauss, or Michael Oakeshott with the 
anti-intellectual ‘no-nothing’ conservatism Trilling was referring to is an 
error of the first order (Barber, 1988; Barry, 1979; Nozick, 1974; Cropsey & 
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Strauss, 1964). Yet it is one that is committed in social work policy 
classrooms routinely every semester.3  
Any social policy instructor who believes that a simple distinction between 
social workers and conservatives will hold up today simply hasn’t listened to 
their students recently! I find that the Vandals have entered the gates, and 
that for every outspokenly “liberal” student I have today, I have an equally 
outspoken “conservative” student, and sometimes two. The vast majority of 
my students, I might add, abhor ideological conflict of any kind and appear to 
wish to remain resolutely uncommitted at any cost! 
The meaning of conservative has changed in other ways as well. For 
example, many recent actions endorsed by so-called “conservatives” are not 
“conservative” at all in any meaningful sense of that term. The recent change 
in family life endorsed by the Baptist convention’s advocacy of the 
subordinate role of wives would constitute one of the most revolutionary 
shifts in family life since the Bolshevik attempts to eliminate the family 
during the 1920’s. And it is similarly ideologically motivated (in this case, 
unfortunately, by a rather shallow ideology which labels television family life 
during the 1950’s as “traditional”). 
On the misguided ideological assumption that “we” (e.g., social workers) 
are all liberals and progressives and “they” (e.g., conservatives) are all wrong,  
My final reason for wishing to get past the liberal-conservative dichotomy 
bears directly on the teaching of social policy. Opinion polls continue to 
regularly support the seemingly paradoxical conclusion that while “liberal” 
political candidates and ideology are unacceptable to the majority of 
Americans at present, a good many liberal social policies continue to receive 
high approval ratings (particularly when they are not labeled as liberal).  
This leads me to the conclusion that continuing to emphasize “insider 
strategies” of the professionalization of reform directed at bureaucratic offices 
and legislative corridors is unlikely to produce much more in the way of 
positive social policy results than it has in the past 30 years. If present trends 
continue, at the very most it will protect what we currently have or minimize 
our losses. 
I would, instead advocate social policy courses built on an outsider 
strategy and recognizing such forces as the adverse ideological shifts in public 
life and devolution. Such courses would emphasize public education, 
citizenship, civic involvement and participation and community action.  
                                               
3 Historical note (2019): Arguably, this more intellectual conservatism apparently ran out of steam 
somewhere in the decade after this paper was first presented. It has been largely replaced by the 
“unconscionable conservatism” of Donald Trump, Dick Cheney, and Mitch McConnell, et. al., that 
John Dean (2006) later analyzed. 
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A New Social Policy Course 
For the past three years, I have been experimenting with a restructured 
masters-level policy course which seeks, in various ways to build upon some 
of the ideas presented in this paper: Engagement with contemporary currents 
in political philosophy, a pragmatic political epistemology (ala Barber), and a 
policy analysis which emphasizes dialectic and dialogue among fellow-
citizens rather than merely professional elites.   
The recently-reaccredited curriculum at the West Virginia University 
School of Social Work features a social policy continuum of four courses: two 
required BSW social policy courses, with one MSW social policy course 
required only of regular (non-advanced standing) students and one social 
policy course required of all graduate (regular and advanced standing) 
students. In our curriculum design, the two undergraduate courses are 
expected to address the liberal arts perspective, professional foundation 
(especially cultural heritage, critical thinking, history and philosophy), values 
and ethics, diversity, social and economic justice, policy and services, 
oppression/discrimination standards. Social welfare history is the central 
thrust of the first course, and policy influence and policy formation processes 
are the organizing framework for the second.   
The first graduate course addresses both history and policy processes in a 
single semester. Which brings us to the second graduate course: For more 
than two decades, the focus in the second graduate policy course in our 
curriculum was on policy analysis methodology falling broadly within the 
parameters of the professional policy paradigm discussed previously.  
Despite tremendous progress in the past two decades, West Virginia is 
still a small rural state with a very limited and traditional state government. 
In this context, practically no graduates were observed entering policy 
positions of the type this course allegedly prepared them for in the past 20 
years. If you set the bar low enough, of course, this statement can be shown 
to be demonstrably false. Most of our students do vote, and some write at 
least occasional letters to Congress. Students interested in entering private 
practice and micro-practice had genuine difficulty seeing any relevance and 
saw policy mostly as a necessary hurdle. 
All of this, however, was not enough to push me into the revisions of our 
second policy course which I am about to describe. The thing which finally 
pushed me over the edge was a push/pull: The pull came from my growing 
sense of intellectual excitement at the large body of work occurring in the 
new political philosophy which has grown up in the wake of John Rawls 
Theory of Justice and my growing sense of frustration at being unable to 
share this with students. The push came from the incredible rise of incivility 
a few years ago associated with the birth of the militia movements, and the 
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efforts by several liberals I know to paint all conservatives as potential 
abortion doctor-killers and federal building-bombers. 
The general outlines of the course are relatively simple to describe: 
Students are expected to read widely, think deeply, write expansively, talk 
intelligently and listen closely to others. Above all else, I have sought  to 
plunge students directly into the ideological streams of contemporary 
political debate and political philosophy bearing on social policy, and to 
encourage them to confront and seek accommodation and accord with their 
fellow citizens over what to do about social problems.  
Rather than textbooks or other pre-digested approaches to standardized 
or codified knowledge, students in this course are fed a steady diet of political 
rhetoric. A reasonable knowledge of social welfare history and policy-
processes, as taught in the earlier courses in our curriculum is assumed, pre-
requisite knowledge for this course. Step one each semester is to clarify the 
distinction between knowledge and opinion, along the lines laid out by Barber 
and discussed previously in this paper.  
One semester, when I co-taught the course for a large class of part-time 
students in our off-campus program, the rhetoric came through the use of 
dozens and dozens of op-ed editorial columns. This past semester, groups of 
students explored the internet as a source of political knowledge, gathering 
on-line newspaper op-eds, position papers by various associations and 
interest groups, and sampling some of that marvelous inventory of lone-wolf 
journalism which has given a radical new populist meaning to First 
Amendment freedoms. 
For several semesters, at least one and as many as four current, polemical 
books serve as designated class texts for discussion and debate. Monographs 
by Theodore Lowi, (1995), Robert Bork, (1996) and Michael Sandel (1996) a 
collection of conservative writings edited by David Brooks, (1995) and a really 
neat history of the Great Society by Irwin Unger (1996).  Like the use of 
similar works by John Kenneth Galbraith, Gunnar Myrdal,  Milton 
Friedman, et. al., in policy courses when the policy professional paradigm 
was still in formation, my interest is neither in presenting ideology nor 
forming orthodoxy. I am interested in initiating students into the streams of 
current discussion and debate. Next spring, I expect to use Moynihan’s Miles 
to Go. . .  and at least one other as-yet-undecided work.  
This past semester, I had roughly 90 students in two sections of the course 
– too many, in my view, to make for meaningful class discussion, so I chose a 
somewhat different path. Prior to the course, I was able to identify 
approximately 140 mostly recent (i.e., published in the past two years) works 
that I thought suitable. Each student selected a unique book from the list and 
prepared a written and oral book reviews. Written book reviews were 
submitted to a special electronic forum where they were available to be read 
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by others in the class. They are still available to students over the summer. 
Students reviewed a recent work on Josiah Royce’s idealistic philosophy of 
community, Rawls’ theory of justice and the 1920’s debate between John 
Dewey-Walter Lippman debate over the nature of the public, and a student 
who had been an undergraduate philosophy major even took on Jurgen 
Habermas’ recent dauntingly complex work.  
I wish I could tell you that each and every student came away with an 
expanded political consciousness and deeper awareness of the current policy 
milieu, but I cannot. I can tell you that these book reviews provoked enough 
breakthroughs and moments of enlightenment about the nature and 
purposes of political dialogue and the inevitably political nature of social 
policy making to more than justify the effort. And, in one of the most amazing 
cases of selection bias I’ve ever witnessed, those students who took on the 
most difficult books generally did the best reports. 
Another element of the course designed to further discussion is a course-
specific email discussion list. All students are expected to activate their 
student email accounts (or use their private or pre-existing accounts) and 
register for the discussion list (SW333-L). Each student is expected to 
generate at least one thought-provoking memo for the class. 
One of the highlights of the course for several years was what I called 
policy fairs which were held in conjunction with some larger school event, 
most typically a semi-annual field instructors meeting. Arrangements are 
made for a large exhibition space and students are encouraged to work in 
small groups to prepare exhibits of an educational or advocacy nature on a 
particular social policy issue or question.  
During one particularly successful semester, students in both sections 
worked together on the common theme of Violence. Through some 
outstanding student efforts and leadership, this particular half-day policy 
exposition featured six outside speakers (several of whom agreed to waive 
their usual speaking fees), original art work for posters and buttons, a 
demonstration in self-defense, an original one-act play written and directed 
by one of the students with volunteer actors from the theater department and 
coverage on the local evening television news. Unfortunately, this session was 
not done in conjunction with another event, and the students were less 
successful at attracting an audience than the television coverage, so 
attendance was limited almost exclusively to students in the class. 
Another central feature of the course is the use of what I have called 
policy salons: Each student is expected to plan, organize and carry out a 
number of such salons, which can be small discussion groups at home or in a 
church or community organizational setting, or large, community. As with 
the books, I am still experimenting with the optimum number of salons to 
require. One is too few and five is too many. 
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Since I typically have two sections of this course going at the same time in 
a particular semester, I have also experimented with cooperation between the 
two sections, generally asking them to create between them, a public (much 
like the public arising from the several 18th century London coffee houses 
which was the subject of a much cited book by Jurgen Habermas.) This effort 
has had decidedly mixed results. These students turn out to be remarkably 
reluctant to engage in what they perceive as an extra-curricular activity, and 
efforts to create more formal coordination mechanisms have been notably 
unsuccessful. On more than one occasion, students have felt that I am 
attempting to pit them against one another or play them against one another. 
Many of the students do appear to get the point however: Meaningful 
coordination is very hard work!  
On the whole, I have been pleased with the results to date of these efforts 




M6.0 Master’s Curriculum Content 
Social Welfare Policy and Services 
 
M6.10 The foundation social welfare policy and services content must include 
the history, mission, and philosophy of the social work profession. Content 
must be presented about the history and current patterns of provision of 
social welfare services, the role of social policy in helping or deterring people 
in the maintenance or attainment of optimal health and well-being, and the 
effect of policy on social work practice. Students must be taught to analyze 
current social policy within the context of historical and contemporary factors 
that shape policy. Content must be presented about the political and 
organizational processes used to influence policy, the process of policy 
formation, and the frameworks for analyzing social policies in light of 







Appendix B  
Curriculum Policy Statement 7.10 (1991) 
 
The major aims of study in this area are to prepare professionals to function 
as informed and competent practitioners in providing services and as 
knowledgeable and committed participants in efforts to achieve change in 
social policies and programs. Students are expected to develop skills in the 
use and application of scientific knowledge to the analysis and development 
of social welfare policy and services. They should know the structure of 
service programs and the history of the organized profession and other social 
welfare institutions. Social work students should also gain an understanding 
of political process and the means to further the achievement of social work 






CONTENT AREAS IN WHICH 
BEHAVIORS ARE TO BE 
DEVELOPED BY THE 
STUDENT 
 
BEHAVIORS TO BE 
DEVELOPED BY STUDENT 
 
 Knowledge       
  Understanding      
   Assessment Skill     
    Interpretation 
Skill 
   
      Scientific 
Viewpoint 
 
      Social 
Viewpoint 
 
       Prof. 
Viewpoin
t 
A. PROBLEM        
1. as manifest need  X X     
2. as person-centered  X X    X 
3. as universal, yet singular X  X  X   
4. as cause and consequence  X X  X   
5. as institutional lack or 
dysfunction 
 X  X   X 
6. as challenge and opportunity  X X    X 
7. as requiring a service solution  X X   X  
8. as requiring social work help  X  X   X 
        
B. POLICY        
9. as social commitment  X  X   X 
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10. as social movement  X  X   X 
11. as planned social change  X X    X 
12. as manifesting the desirable  X  X   X 
13. as manifesting the possible  X X    X 
14. as posing social issues  X  X   X 
15. as social action  X  X   X 
        
C. PROVISION        
16. as mobilized resources of 
society 
 X X    X 
17. as organized in a social 
agency 
 X X    X 
18. as client-centered service  X X    X 
19. as teamwork  X  X   X 
20. as geared to serving the total 
community 
 X X    X 
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